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MURDER IN A PETRI DISH? THE WRATH OF ILLINOIS'
MILLER V. AMERICAN INFERTILITY GROUP: A PUSH FOR
LEGISLATIVE ACTION
BY MARIA PELLEGRINO

INTRODUCTION

When Allison Miller and Todd Parrish went to see
infertility physicians in early 2000, they were most likely not
expecting that their efforts to have a child would make national
headlines. However, that is exactly what happened in February
2005 when a judge refused to dismiss their wrongful death action
against the fertility clinic that allegedly destroyed the couple's preembryo.' The decision rendered in Miller v. American Infertility
Group has become to the Illinois legal and medical communities as
the infamous "shot heard 'round the world" is to Revolutionary
War historians. Cook County Circuit Judge Jeffrey Lawrence II's
opinion determined that an unimplanted preembryo was a human
being under the Illinois Wrongful Death Statute. 2 This ruling came
without precedent in any jurisdiction and without any statutory
guidance; for many in the medical and legal communities, this
represents an example of judicial activism.
Allison Miller and Todd Parrish sought treatment from the
American Infertility Group, where they had nine preembryos
created and stored in January 2000. 3 The physician stated that one
of the preembryos looked "particularly promising," but when the
couple went back to have the preembryos implanted 6 months
later, the couple was told the preembryos were accidentally
discarded.4 The couple filed a complaint against the clinic, in part
1 Lindsay Tanner, Embryo Ruling Worries, Aberdeen Am. News (SD), Feb. 9,
2005, at 8.
2 Kelley Quinn, Unimplanted embryo 'a human, Cook County judge rules,
Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, Feb. 4, 2005.
3 Associated Press, Wrongful Death Suit on Embryo is Allowed Some Experts
Say the Case May Effect Debate on Embryonic Stem Cell Research. Orlando
Sentinel, Feb. 6, 2005.
4 r,1
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claiming negligence and willful and wanton misconduct under
Illinois' Wrongful Death Act. 5 In an earlier decision, Judge David
G. Lichtenstein dismissed the counts with prejudice, allowing them
to amend the sole remaining count6 alleging breach of contract.7
After Judge Lichtenstein retired, the couple moved to reconsider
and, because the original dismissal did not dismiss all counts, the
trial court was allowed to revisit the order, according to Judge
Lawrence. 8
The issues raised in the case were whether a
preembryo is a "human being" under Illinois' Wrongful Death Act
and whether the preembryo must be imglanted in the mother's
uterus for a claim of destruction to stand. Judge Lawrence ruled
that a preembryo was well within the definition of "human being"
under the meaning of the statute and that implantation was not
necessary under the statute to give rise to a claim of wrongful
death. 10
What are the implications of this ruling? Are reproductive
physicians now exposing themselves to wrongful death claims or
even criminal murder charges if a preembryo is destroyed in error
in their lab? Will infertility clinics decide to close their doors
rather than accept this exposure? This ruling raises several issues
in the legal and medical communities, including its impact on the
future of reproductive medicine, as well as, its impact on how

existing laws will be interpreted and applied, and whether or not
the legislature will respond. While a discussion regarding the legal
status of an unimplanted preembryo will likely raise the issue of
when life begins, this issue and many other issues are much too
broad and far-reaching for one comment to discuss. The focus of
this paper will not be on when life begins but rather when the law
will award rights of personhood to embryonic materials.
This comment will address the need for the Illinois
legislature to update its murder and wrongful death statutes
5 Tanner, supra,note 2.
6

id.

7 Miller,

et al. v. American Infertility Group, No. 02 L 7394 (Cir. Ct. of Cook
County filed Feb. 7, 2005).
8 Quinn, supra, note
2.

9

Id.
10 Id.
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limiting coverage to implanted embryos or to statutorily define the
legal status of unimplanted preembryos as special property. This
will help the medical community, patients, and lawyers to have
consistent outcomes in disposal disputes while still encouraging
the progress of scientific research and treatments. Part I of this
comment will provide some basic scientific background by
describing the stages of embryological development. Part II will
discuss current statutory schemes in this area of the law in
jurisdictions outside Illinois. Part III of this comment will discuss
case law in this area and the possible implications of using the
Miller interpretation of the legal status of unimplanted preembryos.
Parts IV and V of this comment will discuss Illinois' current
murder and wrongful death statutes and legislative intent. Finally,
Part VI will discuss policy issues supporting the proposed
legislative changes to incorporate language distinguishing
unimplanted and implanted preembryos or to include a legal
definition or status of an unimplanted preembryo.
I. STAGES OF EMBRYOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT

Any discussion regarding the legal status of unborn
children requires at least, a very basic overview of the stages of
embryological development. Eggs and sperm are known as
gametes and contain each parent's genetic material. Upon a
normal, successful, fertilization, the sperm penetrates the egg and a
series of complex steps will take place." DNA replication will12
begin as development progresses and the cells begin to multiply.
Early cell cycles are called cleavages because each daughter cell is
half the size of the parent cell; each cell is known as a
blastomere.1 3 The cleavage cycles will repeat to an eight-cell

" Ann. A. Kiessling, What is an embryo? 38 Conn. L.Rev. 1051, 1057 (2004).

The process of fertilization, however, can fail during any of the many stepssome sperm will not be able to penetrate the egg, there may be gene defects that
prevent further development, or the egg may not eliminate half of its
chromosomes to match the twenty-three brought by the sperm, for example.
12Id. at 1059
13 Id. at 1060.
At the cleavage stage, the fertilization process is clearly
completed.
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formation known as the morula stage. 14 This stage is the first
developmental stage when some cells are not exposed to the
environment and indicate a commitment to development into an
embryo.' 5 This point, before the blastocyst stage, is sometimes
referred to as the zygotic gene activation stage, which is a
pronuclear stage following fertilization when the exchange
of
6
genetic information between the sperm and the egg occurs.'
In the blastocyst stage, the outside cells create a strong,
sealed barrier protecting the inside cells from the hazards of the
environment, and funnel water and nutrients to the inside cells that
are still rapidly multiplying.' 7 It usually takes about five to eight
days for cells to reach the blastocyst stage, typically occurring
along the trip through the mother's fallopian tube' 8 (in the Petrie
dish for assisted reproductive technology patients).
The implantation stage occurs when the cell mass has
entered the uterus and undergoes a period of rapid growth. The
young embryo sends the mother a sign that it is growing through
the production of human chorionic gonadotropin hormone (hCG).' 9
The issue in this comment is whether the law should give rights to
the preembryo prior to the implantation stage of development.
II. CURRENT STATUTORY SCHEMES

As with many other areas of the law, science has rapidly
progressed in the area of reproductive technology while our laws
have been slow to change or respond. Most statutes attempting to
141id

1 Id. at 1060-1.
161d. at 1088-9.
17 Id. Even at the blastocyst stage, failure can still occur, namely by the failure
to
form a strong inner cell mass necessary for further development.
18

id.

'9 Id. at 1061-1062. Chances for abortion still run at the implantation stage. If
the embryo does not release enough hCG in a timely fashion to the mother, the
uterus will expel the embryo in preparation for another opportunity. Or, failure
of the embryo to properly develop bodily systems will also lead the mother to
miscarry. Hence, it is understandable that many couples are drawn to assisted
reproductive technologies, especially considering women are waiting to have
children longer than in prior generations.
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define terms such as unborn children or fetuses 20 , embryos 2 1, or
20

States with definitions of unborn child or fetus include Ala. Code §26-22-2(8)

(2005) (Alabama defines unborn child , fetus, or embryo as "(a)n individual
organism of the species homo sapiens from fertilization until live birth),; Ariz.
Rev. Stat. §36-2301.01(3) (2004) (Arizona defines viable fetus as the "unborn
offspring of human beings that has reached a stage of fetal development so
that.. .there is reasonable probability of the fetus' sustained survival outside the
uterus..); Ark. Code. Ann. §20-16-1001(3) (2005) (Arkansas defines fetus as "an
organism of the species homo sapiens from eight weeks of development until
complete expulsion or extraction from the woman's body or removal from an
artificial womb or other similar environment designed to nurture the
development of the organism"); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 510/2(6) (2005) (Illinois
statute defines fetus and unborn child as an individual organism of the species
homo sapiens from fertilization until live birth); Iowa Code Ann. §707B.3(l)
(2004) (Iowa defines fetus as a "living organism of the species homo sapiens
from eight weeks' development until complete expulsion or extraction from a
woman's body..."); Mo. Rev. Stat. §188.015 (2005) (Missouri defines "unborn
child, the offspring of human beings from the moment of conception until birth
and at every stage of its biological development, including the human conceptus,
zygote, morula, blastocyst, embryo, and fetus"); N.M. Stat. Ann. §24-9A-1
(2005) (New Mexico defines fetus as product of conception from the time of
conception until the expulsion or extraction of the fetus or the opening of the
uterine cavity...)
21 States with definitions of embryo include: Ark. Code. Ann.. §20-16-1001
(2005) (Arkansas defines embryo as an "organism of the species homo sapiens
from the single cell stage to eight weeks of development"); Idaho Code § 184016(3) (2005) (Idaho defines human embryo and fetus "as any human in
utero"), Iowa Code Ann. §707B.3 (2004) (Iowa defines human embryo as a
"living organism of the species homo sapiens from the single-celled stage to
eight weeks' development"); La. Rev. Stat. 9:121 (2005) (Louisiana defines
human embryo as an in vitro fertilized human ovum, with certain rights granted
by law, composed of one or more living human cells and human genetic material
so unified and organized that it will develop in utero into an unborn child");
Mich. Comp. Laws §333.16274(5)(b) (2005) (Michigan defines human embryo
as a human egg cell with a full genetic composition capable of differentiating
and maturing into a complete human being); 10 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs.
§16.2 (2005) (New York Ionizing Radiation statute defines embryo/fetus as the
"developing human organism from conception until the time of birth"); N.D
Cent. Code §12.1-39-01 (2005) (North Dakota defines fetus as a "living
organism of the species home sapiens from eight weeks' development until
complete expulsion.." and embryo as the "single-celled state to eight weeks
development"); 63 Okla. Stat. §1-730 (2004) (Oklahoma defines unborn child
means the "unborn offspring of human beings from the moment of conception,
through pregnancy, and until live birth including the human conceptus, zygote,
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even more rarely, preembryos, 22 are found in state abortion
statutes 23 or anti-cloning statutes 24 ; few may be found in surrogacy
statutes 25 . The way in which the state statutes define or legally
treat preembryos or preembryos can or will affect what rights are
granted to them. If the statutes are treating preembryos as persons,
custody rights would follow; if the statutes are treating preembryos
as property, disposition of property or property rights would
follow. The statutes, as well as the courts, which will be discussed
later, most commonly treat preembryos as property.
Florida's domestic relations act defines a preembryo as the
"product of fertilization of an egg by a sperm until the appearance
of the embryonic axis." 2 6 The embryonic axis typically begins
formation during days 15 through 17.27 Later in the act, the statute
addresses the disposition of eggs, sperm, or preembryos rather than
morula, blastocyst, embryo, and fetus"); S.D. Codified Laws §34-14-20 (2005)
(defines human embryo as a living organism of the species homo sapien at the
earliest stages of development (including the single-celled stage) that is not
located in a woman's body"); S.D. Codified Laws §34-23A-1 (2005) (defines
fetus as the "biological offspring, including the implanted embryo or unborn
child, of human parents); Va. Code Ann. §20-156 (2005) (defines embryo means
the "organism resulting from the union of a sperm and an ovum from the first
cell division until approximately the end of the second month of gestation").
22 The few states attempting to define preembryo: Fla.Stat.Ann. §742.13(12)
(2005) (Florida defines preembryo as the product of fertilization of an egg by a
sperm until the appearance of the embryonic axis); 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. 47/10
(2005) (Illinois defines preembryo as a "fertilized egg prior to 14 days of
development"); N.H.Rev. Stat. Ann. §168-B:1 (2004) (New Hampshire defines
preembryo as "the cell mass that results from fertilization of an ovum prior to
implantation")
23 Abortion statutes with definitions pertaining to fetus, embryo, and preembryo
include: Ala. Code. § 26-22-2 (2005); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 36-2301.01 (2004);
Idaho Code §18-4016, (2004); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 510/2; (2005) Mo. Ann. Stat.
§ 188.015 (2005); 63 Okla. St. §1-730 (2004).
4 Anti-cloning or experimentation statutes with definitions pertaining to fetus,
embryo, preembryo include: Ark. Code Ann. § 20-16-1001 (2005); Iowa Code
707B.3 (2004); Mich. Comp. Laws. §333.16274 (2005); N.M. Stat. Ann. §249a-I (2005); S.D. Codified Laws §34-14-20 (2005).
25 Fla. Stat. Ann. §742.13 (2005); 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. 47/10 (2005); N.H. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §168-B: l (2004); Va. Code Ann. §20-156 (2005).
26 Fla. Stat. Ann. §742-13 (2005).
27 http://embryology.med.unsw.edu.au/wwwhuman/Stages/stage7.htm
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treating them in terms of custody of children. 28 The laws normally
address the disposition of typical marital property and address the
placement of children as custodial rights.29
Under Judge
Lawrence's interpretation of human being, that includes an
unimplanted preembryo, an act such as Florida's should address
the disposition of such preembryos in the custody agreement, as
the preembryo is a human being not property. But Florida's act is
clear-it provides that a couple and their physician enter into a
written agreement outlining the disposition of the eggs, sperm, and
preembryos should a divorce, death, or other unforeseen
circumstance occur. 30 Further, if no written agreement was
executed, the act treats the organisms-the eggs, sperm and
preembryos-as property by stating that remaining eggs or sperm
"shall remain under the control of the party that provide(d) the
eggs or sperm", and leaving "decision making authority
regarding
31
the disposition of the preembryos" to the couple.
Similarly, Texas' Family Code provides that if a marriage
dissolves before use of eggs, sperm, or embryos occurs, a resulting
child from assisted reproductive technology without consent of the
other spouse will result in that spouse not being considered a
parent. 32 If the laboratory created embryos were to be considered
humans, one would presume that the Texas Family Code would
treat them as children of the marriage upon divorce under its
custody laws. Colorado and Delaware law also provide that if a
marriage ends before placement of eggs, sperm, or embryos, a
33
former spouse will be considered a parent if a child is born after.
If these embryos were considered humans by the legislature, we
would be discussing custody rights and not establishing parentage.
South Dakota's statutory scheme appears to have more
consistency than some others by differentiating implanted and
unimplanted organisms in appropriate areas of its code, but still
leaves areas open for interpretation. For instance, in its statute
28

Fla. Stat. Ann. §742.17 (2005).

29

See Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution § 2.01--§5.

30 id.
3 1id
32

33

Tex. Fam. Code § 160.706 (2005).
Colo. Rev. Stat. 19-4-106 (2005); 13 Del. Code Ann. §8-706 (2005).
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outlawing nontherapeutic research on human embryos, the term
human embryo is defined as a "living organism of the species
homo sapiens at the earliest stages of development (including the
single-celled stage) that is not located in a woman's body."34 The
abortion statute, however, defines fetus much differently than the
definition of an embryo by saying a fetus is "the biological
offspring, including the implanted embryo or unborn child, of
human parents." 35 However, the requirement that the embryo be
36
implanted is not clear in South Dakota's wrongful death statute,
which does not define "unborn child".37 South Dakota's criminal
statute, however, requires the perpetrator to know or reasonably
have known that a "woman was bearing a child", which would
require implantation. 38 Therefore, one could be liable for wrongful
death, but not murder, if the judiciary decides to define an unborn
child as an embryo as defined under South Dakota's
nontherapeutic research statute.
Other states have similarly confusing statutory language
that potentially can lead to judicial interpretation resulting in very
different outcomes in different states. For instance, Minnesota's
criminal statute defines "unborn child" as the "unborn offspring of
a human being conceived not yet born," 39 but does not specify
when conception is determined-fertilization, zygote, preembryo,
implantation, etc. Minnesota's abortion statute provides that an
unborn child is a member of the species homo sapiens from
fertilization until birth,4 ° which leads one to believe implantation is
not necessary to be considered an unborn child. To further confuse
things, Minnesota's wrongful death statute does not mention
unborn children at all, let alone define the term.41 Therefore,
34S.D.
35 S.D.

Codified Laws §34-14-20 (2005) (emphasis added).
Codified Laws 34-23A-1 (2005) (emphasis added).
36 S.D. Codified Laws § 21-5-1 (2005).
37 Id. See also, Wiersma v. Maple Leaf Farms (In re Certification of a Question
of Law), 543 N.W.2d 787 (S.D. 1996) (state supreme court holding that South
Dakota's wrongful death act's use of terminology "unborn child" encompassed
viable and nonviable fetuses)
38 S.D. Codified Laws § 22-16-1.1 (2005).
31 Minn. Stat. 609.266(a) (2004); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-39-01 (2005).
40 Minn. Stat. 145.421 (2004).
41 Minn. Stat. § 573.02 (2004).
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under Minnesota's statutory scheme, the judiciary could rule to
allow a wrongful death claim for a destroyed preembryo or could
allow criminal charges against the person or entity responsible for
the destruction of a preembryo.
By contrast, the Mississippi criminal statute defines a
human being as including an unborn child at "every stage of
gestation from conception until live birth and the term 'unborn
child' means a member of the species homo sapiens, at any stage
of development, who is carried in the womb.""2 Under the
Mississippi criminal statute, the destruction of an unimplanted
preembryo would not fall into the criminal definition of unborn
child although civil liability would be unclear if the judiciary chose
not to follow this definition since its wrongful death statute does
not define "unborn quick child".43
While Florida, Texas, and Colorado's statutory schemes
appear to treat unimplanted preembryos as property and other
states, such as Minnesota, seem unclear as to differentiating
implanted and unimplanted embryos, Louisiana has taken a
seemingly radically different turn. Louisiana's Civil Code defines
two types of persons: natural persons, which are human beings,
and juridical persons, which are entities which the law "attributes
personality, such as a corporation or a partnership. ' 44 The Revised
Statutes go on to define a human embryo as "an in vitro fertilized
human ovum, with certain rights granted by law, composed of one
or more living human cells and human genetic material so unified
and organized that it will develop in utero into an unborn child. ' 5
Louisiana Revised Statutes then grant the embryo rights by stating
"(a)n in vitro fertilized human ovum exists as a juridical person
until such time as the in vitro fertilized ovum is implanted in the
womb; or at any other time when rights attach to an unborn child
in accordance with law." 46 Once the embryo is implanted, the
rights of an unborn child would seemingly apply, as the Louisiana
Civil Code defines an unborn child as "a natural person for
Miss. Code. Ann. §97-3-37(1) (2005) (emphasis added).
§11-7-13 (2005).
44 La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 24 (2005).
45 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 9:121 (2005).
46 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 9:123 (2005).
42

43 Miss. Code. Ann.
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whatever relates to its interests from the moment of conception. If
the child is born dead, it shall be considered never to have existed
as a person, except for purposes of actions resulting from its
wrongful death."47
So what does the juridical person status give a Louisiana
preembryo? The Revised Statutes' chapter on human embryos
addresses several issues left open in most states. First, the
preembryo is given an identity of its own, not unlike a corporation,
allowing the organism to sue and be sued.48 Second, the
preembryo is considered a "biological human being" and not
simply property-the medical facility has no ownership of the
preembryo and if the parents are identified, they have all parental
rights. 49 The statutes further provide that it is the responsibility of
the medical facility that created the preembryo to ensure its
safekeeping and destruction of it is prohibited, though the original
parents can denounce their parental rights and another couple can
adopt the preembryo for implantation. 50
Consistent with its
scheme that the preembryo is a person, the judicial standard for
deciding disputes is the "best interest of the in vitro fertilized
ovum," as the best interest of the child is used in most jurisdictions
for deciding custody of children. 5 1 Inheritance rights, however,
will not apply to2 the preembryo unless implanted and a child is
5
born as a result.
Having statutorily established that a preembryo, though not
a natural person, is a juridical person with rights similar to an
existing child, liability if the preembryo is harmed is still unclear.
Louisiana Revised Code §9:132 removes strict liability or liability,
including actions involving succession and inheritance rights, for
any physician, clinic, or hospital when they have acted in "good
faith in the screening, collection, conservation, preparation,
transfer, or cryopreservation of the human ovum fertilized in vitro
La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 26 (2005).
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 9:124 (2005).
49 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 9:126 (2005).
50 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 9:127-130 (2005).
51La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 9:131 (2005).
52 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 9:133 (2005).
47
48
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for transfer to the human uterus., 53 Like other states that do not
have clear definitions, Louisiana is still somewhat susceptible to
judicial activism or radical interpretations. Although criminal
charges would be unlikely, Louisiana practitioners may still be
exposed to wrongful death claims. The Louisiana Criminal Code
addresses feticide and defines feticide as the killing of an unborn
child,54 which under Louisiana law specifies is a natural person.55
Therefore, physicians or other practitioners, and even the parents
of a preembryo, are not exposing themselves to criminal charges.
The Louisiana wrongful death statute, however, is not so clear.
The statute refers to "persons" without differentiating between
natural and juridical persons, leaving open the possibility that the
destruction of a preembryo could result in a wrongful death
56
action.
After reviewing various jurisdictions' statutes on the legal
status of preembryos, the different possible outcomes are not so
radical considering the lack of clear direction from the legislature.
Unimplanted preembryo disputes, however, are not foreign to the
courts since the advent of assisted reproductive technology.
Judicial responses in the absence of clear statutory definitions of
preembryos lean towards treating them as a new category of
special property.
III. CASE LAW ON UNIMPLANTED PREEMBRYO DISPUTES
As technology rapidly advances, the law traditionally has
had trouble keeping up with all of the changes. Defining things
such as preembryos, zygotes, and other organisms has evolved
with science, and the legal status of such has not been and still is
not clear. Under common law, embryos and fetuses have not
enjoyed any rights until birth, which meant injuries, such as a
mother miscarrying after a car accident, went unactionable on

La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 9:132 (2005).
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 14:32.5 (2005). The statue provides an exception for
mothers who have consented to an abortion.
'5 Supra note 50.
56 La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2315.2 (2005).
13
54
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behalf of the fetus.57 In 1973 the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade
held that a fetus was not to be classified as a person under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 58 The Court seemed to treat fetuses as
their own special category, leaving open exactly what their legal
status is. 59
Just because the Constitution does not require
protection of unborn fetuses as persons, it does not bar the states
from enacting laws that protect the unborn fetuses, providing the
60
In fact,
laws do not interfere with a woman's right to privacy.
many states have recognized rights of unborn children in the
context of murder and wrongful death statutes, as discussed in Part
II of this comment. 6 '
The limited case law regarding disputes involving frozen
unimplanted preembryos lean towards classifying them as "special
property"-property that shall be treated with a higher degree of
respect than any human tissue. The pinnacle case involving a
dispute over frozen preembryos was Davis v. Davis.62 In that case,
the court struggled to determine whether preembryos should be
considered "persons" or "property".63 The Davis court looked at
several issues. First, it ruled that the appellate court correctly
decided that preembryos could not be considered persons under
Tennessee law. 64 Tennessee's Wrongful Death Statute 65 did not
Erin P. George, Comment: The Stem Cell Debate: The Legal, Political,and
EthicalIssues SurroundingFederalFunding Of Scientific Research On Human
Embryos, 12 Alb. L.J.Sci. & Tech. 747, 763 (2002)
58 Anderson, Erik. Constitutionalizing Chevron: Filling up on Interpretive
Equality. 42 B.C.L.Rev. 349, 373 (2001).
57

59 Id.
60 Id.
61

Supra notes 20-22 referring to state wrongful death and murder statutes

covering unborn children.
62 Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992). The case involved a divorcing
couple's dispute over their frozen preembryos. Mary Sue Davis originally
desired to have control over the preembryos for future implantation in her own
uterus, later remarried and changed her mind about using them for herself, and
decided she wished to donate the preembryos. Junior Davis did not wanted the
preembryos to remain frozen as he did not desire to father a child outside of the
bounds of marriage.
63 Id. at 594-5.
' Id. at 595.
6' Tenn. Code Ann.20-5-106 (2005).

2004-2005

MURDER IN A PETRI DISH

allow a wrongful death claim for a viable fetus unless it was born
alive. 66 Further, Tennessee's abortion statute did not give viable
fetuses the same protection as a person, since it allowed abortion to
occur after viability to save the life of the mother, while the murder
statute made it a crime to murder a viable fetus. 6 7 Therefore, the
Tennessee statutory scheme gave increasing protection to embryos
as they continually develop but did not quite afford equal
protection to them as persons. 68 Second, the court looked at
federal law and observed that the U.S. Supreme Court in Roe v.
Wade69 "refused to hold that the fetus possesses independent
rights" under the law, noting for example that the Fourteenth
Amendment only affords equal protection and due process of law
to "persons born or naturalized in the United States." 70 Finally, the
court looked to the American Fertility Society's viewpoint that
preembryos should be treated as something more than just mere
human tissue but should not be treated as an actual person. 7 1 The
Tennessee Supreme Court went on to conclude that "preembryos
are not, strictly speaking, either 'persons' or 'property,' but occupy
an interim category that entitles them to special respect because of
their potential for human life.",72 Further, the court introduced a
balancing of the parties' interest in determining disposition, stating
that typically the party that wants to avoid procreation will prevail73
unless the other party seemingly has no other way to reproduce.
The view that preembryos deserve a "special property" status
seems to be the view to follow.
New York also faced a preembryo disposition dispute in
Kass v. Kass.74 In Kass, a divorcing couple disagreed on the fate
of their frozen preembryos, similarly to the Davis couple. 75 In this
66
67

Supra note 64.
Id.

68

id.

69
70

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113.

id.

71Davis,
72

842 S.W.2d at 596.

Id. at 597.
73
Id. at 603-4.
74 Kass v. Kass, 235 A.D.2d 150 (New York 1997).
75 id.

BUFFALO WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL

Vol. XIII

case, however, the couple signed an informed consent agreement
providing that if the couple decided not to implant the preembryos
for themselves and could not agree on their disposition, the in vitro
fertilization clinic would retain control of the preembryos for use
in research.76 The Kass court followed the Davis decision that the
court must look to the original intent of the parties creating the
preembryos, which in Kass was formalized in the informed consent
agreement, and in absence of evidence of intent, the court will
balance the parties' interests. 77 The mere fact that the Kass court
did not discuss the legal status of a preembryo shows that the court
was following the Davis rule of treating preembryos as "special
property". Had the court believed the preembryos were "persons"
under New York law, the informed consent agreement would have
discussed custody of the couple's children and could not have
allowed for their destruction.
New Jersey also dealt with a preembryo dispute as a
"special property" dispute in J.B. v. MB.78 In this case, the
husband wanted the preembryos donated to another couple but the
wife wanted to either leave them frozen or have them destroyed.79
As in Kass, the court looked to the intent of the parties, who signed
an informed consent agreement, which contained a clause
relinquishing control of the preembryos to the in vitro fertilization
clinic should the parties dissolve their marriage or both die without
a will. 8° The court upheld the Davis rule that first the intent of the
parties must be considered, including any signed agreements, and
if a dispute still arises, the court will have to balance the parties'
interests giving weight to the party wishing to avoid procreating.8
Again, the court operated on the presumption that preembryos are
"special property" versus persons, as the court could not order the
destruction of persons, as this court in fact did.82
76Id. at 151-154.
77

71

Id. at 160-163.

J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001).

79 Id.

80

ld. at 713.

81 Id. at
82

719-20.

Id. See also, Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002) (Divorcing

couple dispute over frozen preembryos where court upheld agreement to give
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Court treatment of preembryos as special property versus
actual children was also evident in Iowa's In re Marriage of
Witten.83 In this case, the wife argued that the preembryos fate
should be determined by the best interest of the child standard
found in Iowa's statute governing child custody whereas the
husband argued a preembryo is not a child under Iowa law. 84 The
court looked to wrongful death cases where the court showed signs
of inconsistencies by allowing claims for the deaths of unborn
85
fetuses yet did not rule they were "persons" under the statute.
The court went on to disregard the actual decisions in the wrongful
death cases but followed the decision-making guidelines of those
courts. Those courts first looked to the words of the statute and
then looked to the legislative intent behind the statute, but in this
case the court would only look to the statute in question-Iowa
86 Here, the court
Code Chapter 598 regarding custody of children. 86
determined that the principles behind the custody statute, which are
to ensure the child maintains contact with and develops strong
relationships with both parents, simply do not apply to the issues
relating to the disposition of frozen preembryos. 87 The Iowa
Supreme Court then went on to decide that the parties themselves
must decide the ultimate disposition and ordered an injunction
against the destruction of the preembryos until both parties
agreed.88

Treating preembryos as special property is a trend also
found in recent cases not involving divorce. A recent Connecticut
case involved a malpractice suit against medical professionals who
performed an autopsy on a stillborn fetus against the mother's
wishes. The court followed the Davis court's logic that a
control to the in vitro fertilization clinic), Bohn v. Ann Arbor Reproductive
Medical Assocs., 1999 Mich. App. Lexis 2210 (Michigan appellate court
declined to expand definition of "child" in child custody statute to include
preembryos noting that would be the job of the legislature not the judiciary).
83 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003).
84
Id. at 773.
85 Id. at 775.
86 id.
87

1

88

d. at 775-6.
Id. at 783. The court ordered the party who refused to destruction to pay for

the storage fees.
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preembryo, or in this case, a fetus outside the mother's womb, is
awarded "special property" status and upheld the malpractice
claim89 . In Rhode Island, the state Supreme Court dealt with the
issue of preembryos qualifying as victims. In Frisina v. Women
and Infants Hospital of Rhode Island,plaintiffs were patients of an
in vitro fertilization clinic that lost some of the plaintiffs' frozen
preembryos. 90
The plaintiffs sued on theories of negligent
infliction of emotional distress, medical malpractice, bailment, and
breach of contract, alleging they suffered loss of irreplaceable
property. 91 The defendant argued preembryos are not persons
under the law and therefore cannot be considered victims, which is
a necessary element for the negligent infliction of emotional
distress claim. 92 The court agreed with the defendant that under
Rhode Island law, preembryos were not considered persons, and
therefore, dismissed the negligent infliction of emotional distress
claim. 93 The court did uphold the breach of contract claim for
damages of loss of irreplaceable property since although
preembryos would not be considered persons,
they would be
94
considered property under Rhode Island law.
The federal courts have also stated that preembryos do not
enjoy the same protection as persons but rather are a form of
special property. In Doe v. Irvine Sci. Sales, a couple alleged an
action involving damage to property when the couple learned that
their preembryos were exposed to a contaminant containing a fatal
95
disease, which made the preembryos unsuitable for implantation.
The court noted the couple could not allege a claim on behalf of
the preembryo because preembryos are not eligible for the same
protection awarded to persons, and further noted that the federal
Janicki v. Hospital of St. Raphael, 744 A.2d 963, 970-1 (Conn. 1999).
90 Frisina v. Women & Infants Hospital of Rhode Island, 2002 R.I. Super. Lexis
89

73, *1.
9"Id. at *6.
92

Id. The defendant relied on a previous Rhode Island decision in Miccolis v.

Arnica Mutual Insurance Co., 587 A.2d 67, 71 (R.I. 1991) which held that under
Rhode Island's wrongful death statute, a nonviable fetus is not a person.
93
Id. at *30.
94
Id. at *32 (referring to Davis and its progeny).
95 Doe v. Irvine Sci. Sales Co., 7 F. Supp. 2d 737 (E.D. Va. 1998)
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courts have not recognized Preembryos as having a higher legal
status as "special" property. 9 Therefore, from the Supreme Court
to the Federal Courts to State Courts, the trend has been to treat
preembryos as special property-a type of property warranting a
higher degree of protection.
IV.

ILLINOIS' MURDER STATUTE & LEGISLATIVE INTENT

Despite the Supreme Court's failure to give legal status or
special protection under the Constitution in Roe v. Wade, Illinois is
one of those states that decided to award protection to unborn
fetuses in its murder statute. In People v. Greer,9 7 a man was
convicted of beating his eight and one half month pregnant
girlfriend and the fetus to death. The conviction of the death of the
fetus was overturned, however, because the Illinois murder statute
at the time did not have a feticide clause. 98 Common law dictated
that the killing of a fetus was not murder unless the fetus was born
alive and then died from preceding injuries. 99 The Illinois
legislature responded by enacting a feticide statute in 1981, which
required three main elements: 1) that the actor knew or should
have reasonably known that the mother was pregnant; 2) that the
actor either attempted or committed the felony against the mother
or acted in a way which evidenced an intent to cause death or great
bodily harm to the mother; and 3) that the fetus was "capable, at
the time of its death, of sustained life outside of the mother's
womb with or without life support equipment" and such capacity
had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 100 The significance in
the initial change in the statute was that it had a viability

96

Id. at 741-2. The court cited Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158, 35 L. Ed. 2d

147, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973) for the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment's
use of the word person did not include unborn children as evidence that the
frozen preembryos are not to be treated as persons under the law.
97 People v. Greer, 79 Ill.2d 103 (1980).
98 People v. Ford, 221 Ill. App.3d 354, 366 (1991)

99

Id

100People v. Ford, 221 Ill. App.3d 354, 366 (citing I11.Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38,

par. 9 -- 1.1 (b)
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requirement and did not criminalize acts against nonviable
fetuses.' ° '
The Illinois legislature then took action to broaden the
murder statute to cover unborn children regardless of viability.
The legislature acted again in 1986, rewriting the feticide statute to
cover five separate offenses: "1) intentional homicide of an unborn
child; (2) voluntary manslaughter of an unborn child; (3)
involuntary manslaughter and reckless homicide of an unborn
child; (4) battery of an unborn child; and (5) aggravated battery of
an unborn child."'' 0 2 The revised 1987 statute provides that a
person commits intentional homicide of an unborn child when he
performs acts which cause the death of the unborn child, without
lawful justification when he knew that his acts would likely cause
the death or great bodily harm to the pregnant woman or to her
unborn child, and he knew that the woman was pregnant. 10 3 The
statute then defines unborn child as any individual of the human
species from fertilization until birth, thus eliminating the viability
and born alive requirements.' 0 4 Voluntary manslaughter requires
that:
[A] person who kills an unborn child without lawful
justification commits voluntary manslaughter of an
unborn child if at the time of the killing he is acting
under a sudden and intense passion resulting from
serious provocation by another whom the offender
endeavors to kill, but he negligently or accidentally
causes the death of the unborn child.'0 5
Involuntary manslaughter or reckless homicide of an unborn child
requires:

101
People v. Ford, 221 111. App.3d 354, 366 (1991).
102 Id. (citing Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9/1.2, 2.1, 3.2 and par. 12/3.1 and
4.4)
103 Id. (citing Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, pars. 9/1.2(a)(2), (a)(3)).
1o4
Id. (citing Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9/1.2(b).
'o' 720 I11.Comp. Stat. 5/9-2.1 (2004).
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[A] person who unintentionally kills an unborn
child without lawful justification commits
involuntary manslaughter of an unborn child if his
acts whether lawful or unlawful which cause the
death are such as are likely to cause death or great
bodily harm to some individual, and he performs
them recklessly... 106
The new statute was questioned in People v. Ford."7 In

that case, the defendant was convicted of feticide after repeatedly
kicking his stepdaughter's stomach when she was five and one-half
months pregnant, resulting in the death of the unborn child.108 The
defendant challenged the statute by arguing it was a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution
because the statute does not distinguish between viable and
nonviable fetuses, which Roe v. Wade distinguished by holding
women only had the right to abort nonviable fetuses and viable
fetuses only to protect the life of the mother. 10 9 The defendant
argued that it was unfair that a woman could destroy her nonviable
fetus without repercussion but that he faced criminal charges under
the murder statute.110 The Illinois Appellate Court rejected the
defendant's argument by holding that feticide statute does not
affect any fundamental right of the defendant and therefore, the
statute is only subject to a rational basis scrutiny versus a strict
scrutiny review."' Under a rational basis review, the court upheld
the legislature's interest in protecting the "potentiality of human
life" as a legitimate interest." 2 The court also rejected the
defendant's argument that the statute was void for vagueness
because when life begins and ends is a matter still under debate." 3
The court held that the jury only had to decide whether the fetus at
720 Il. Comp. Stat. 5/9-3.2 (2004).
Ford, supra note 103.
id.
'09 Id. at 368.
lHOld
106

107
108

"

" Id. at 368-369.
112 id

113

Id. at 370.
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one point had life-defined by the statute as upon fertilization and
until birth-not whether its form could be considered a person 114
or
human being; and, therefore, the statute was not vague.
However, a case involving a preembryo outside of the mother's
womb has not been considered under the murder statute. So,
whether the Parrishes could bring criminal charges against the
laboratory for discarding their preembryos is unclear under Illinois
law as it stands today.
When the Illinois legislature updated the murder statute in
1986, it unfortunately did not leave behind any publicly recorded
debate. 1 5 Because the legislature adopted the act without debate,
we can only surmise that it was trying to respond to outcomes such
as People v. Greer. To expand the legislative intent of the statute
to encompass situations like that in Miller, however, may be an act
of judicial activism rather than sound law. A key distinction
between implanted and unimplanted preembryos is the fact that an
unimplanted preembryo, without any assistance by a medical
doctor, cannot continue to grow full term. Expanding the purpose
of allowing criminal liability for causing the death of a woman's
fetus, whether at a stage of viability or not, does not necessarily
mean the legislature intended or even contemplated allowing
criminal liability for frozen preembryos in a laboratory.
V.

ILLINOIS'

WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTE & LEGISLATIVE

INTENT

While Illinois' criminal statute defines an unborn child as
an organism from time of fertilization until time of live birth," 6 the
Illinois Wrongful Death Statute was amended to address feticide
by including the language Judge Lawrence interpreted so broadly:
The state of gestation or development of a human
being when an injury is caused, when an injury
takes effect, or at death, shall not foreclose
maintenance of any cause of action under the law of
1 14

id.

115 Public Act 84-1414, Senate Bill No.1942, approved Sept. 19, 1986.
116 720 I11.Comp. Stat. 5/9-1.2 (2005).
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this State arising from the death of a human being
caused by wrongful act, neglect or default." 17
This statutory language does not mention embryo,
preembryo, fetus, unborn child, or other terminology seen in other
parts of the code addressing the status of unborn children, such as
the abortion statute, gestational surrogacy statute, or the criminal
code. " 8 Had Judge Lawrence referred to Illinois' Gestational
Surrogacy Statute,'19 which defines a preembryo as a "fertilized
egg prior to 14 days of development," he may have come out
differently, as this statute seems to point to recognizing a different
stage of development; otherwise, the surrogacy statute could have
been adopted with language such as "human being" or "unborn
child."' 12
The current language leaves open for interpretation
what exactly falls into "the state of gestation or development."
This left Judge Lawrence the opportunity to declare an
unimplanted embryo a person under Illinois' Wrongful Death
Statute.
Prior to the 1980 amendment above, Illinois courts held
that viability was required in order to sustain a wrongful death
claim. But then there was Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg.12 1 In
that case, a mother in her 3 6 th week of pregnancy died as a result of
an automobile accident; Baby Boy Chrisafogeorgis was
stillborn. 122 The Illinois Supreme Court allowed the father to
pursue a wrongful death claim on behalf of the stillborn child,
which was a departure from the common law requirement that the
child be born alive first.' 23 The court considered the incongruity of
the results that such a demarcation would cause---one fetus
breathes for a second and dies may collect versus 1one
with slightly
24
worse injury causing death prior to birth does not.
17 740 I11.
Comp. Stat. 180/2.2 (2005).
118 See

supra notes 19, 20, 21, and 22 citing Illinois statutes.

750 IlI.Comp.Stat. 47/10 (2005).
Supra note 120.
121Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 I1l.2d 368 (1973).
"9
120

122 id.

123

Id. at 375.

124 id.
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Was this a case of judicial activism? A strong dissenting
opinion pointed out that the majority was violating not only
common law tradition but also the statute. 125 The dissent pointed
out that the Illinois Wrongful Death Statute was almost identical to
the original 1853 statute; the legislature had not defined the word
"person" in the original statute nor since.' 26 The only guidance
from the Courts regarding the issue had been Roe v. Wade, where
the Supreme Court declared that unborn children are not "persons"
under the eyes of the Constitution. 12 7 Roe also stated that at any
stage subsequent to viability, the legislature may proscribe against
abortion with the exception of abortions to save the life of the
mother. 128 Therefore, the dissent argues, the court cannot correct
the incongruous outcomes of prohibiting wrongful death claims for
fetuses that are not born alive, but rather, only the legislature can
the Wrongful Death Statute to include
change this by updating
29
unborn children.'
Once Chrisafogeorgis expanded wrongful death claims to
include those on behalf of stillborn children, the Illinois Supreme
Court then went on to expand the area of fetal rights by allowing
claims for prenatal injuries to include non-viable fetuses in
Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital.130 In that case, the defendant
hospital performed a blood transfusion on a thirteen year-old girl,
which caused problems several years later in her pregnancy that
ultimately resulted in premature birth and permanent brain
damage.' 3 '
The Illinois Supreme Court rejected the viability
requirement to sustain claims for prenatal injury because the
medical community cannot establish when viability is certain, as
there are many factors that contribute to viability.'3 2 In addition,
the Court did not like that this bright line rule barred some of the
125
126

Id. at 376-78.
Id. (Illinois' statute was a virtual copy of an 1847 New York statute, which

was
a copy of an 1846 English statute known as Lord Campbell's Act.)
127 Id. at 380. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 161-65 (1973).)
128 id.
2

1 9 id.
130
131
13 2

Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, 67 11.2d 348 (1977).
Id.
Id.

at 352-3.
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most meritorious claims because some prenatal injuries
may only
33
be caused during the early parts of development. 1
The Seventh Circuit continued with this policy of
protecting fetuses in Roberts v. Patel.134 In that case, physicians
allegedly told a pregnant woman to use alcohol and drugs to avoid
premature labor, which resulted in a baby born with spastic
quadriplegia. 135 The court looked to Chrisafogeorgisand Renslow
when it determined that Illinois state policy favored protection of
fetuses.136 Whether this is a true reflection of the law or continued
judicial activism is difficult to determine when the legislature has
not left a record or adopted clear language in the statute.
When the Illinois legislature updated the Wrongful Death
Statute in 1980, the Senate debates show that the sponsoring
senator referred to both Chrisafogeorgis and Renslow as reasons
for updating the statute.' 37 The record shows that the purpose of
the amendment was to "close a gap" in the law to ensure coverage
for nonviable fetuses since there was uncertainty in the courts as to
whether nonviable fetuses were protected.138 However, the debates
did not cover defining "human being;" Judge Lawrence then used
traditional means of statutory construction-plain language
meaning and reference to the abortion statute debates. 139 Judge
Lawrence stated in his opinion that although philosophers debate,
the Illinois legislature believes life begins at conception and points
to language used in the abortion statute. 140 This line of reasoning
133
Id.
134Roberts v. Patel, 620 F.Supp.323 (D.C.Ill. 1985). (Federal Appellate Court

upheld Illinois policy favoring protection of fetuses and allowed claim for
prenatal injury.)
135Id.
136 Id. at 326.

137 Miller, supra note 7.
138 Id.
139id.

140Id. Judge Lawrence's opinion refers to Section one of the Abortion Law
which declares: "(t)he General Assembly of the State of Illinois do solemnly
declare and find in reaffirmation of the longstanding policy of this State, that the
unborn child is a human being from the time of conception and is, therefore, a
legal person for purposes of the unborn child's right to life and is entitled to the
right to life from conception under the laws and Constitution of this State. 720

BUFFALO WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL

Vol. XIII

fails the true issue of this paper which is not whether life begins at
conception, viability, or birth but rather when the law should begin
affording the rights and protections it gives to living, breathing
persons. The Supreme Court has already considered this issue in
Roe v. Wade, when it refused to grant that a fetus was a person
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 14 1 In deciding that a fetus was
not a person under the Fourteenth Amendment without classifying
it as property leaves state legislatures with the responsibility of
deciding what protections it will afford to them; hence, the law is
context
not required to treat all stages of "life" (defined in this
42
from conception to birth) the rights of a born individual. 1
VI.

ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL STATUS OF PREEMBRYOS AND
PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE ACTION

A. Legal Certainty
Human tissues and organs have been treated as property in
other areas of the law. Blood for instance, has been treated as a
commodity. 143 Spleen cells were not considered property in an
In Moore v. Regents of the University of
unusual case.
144
California, the court held that the plaintiff did not retain
property rights in his spleen cells that were removed from his body
and used in subsequent research without his consent.' 45 However,
the California Supreme Court did not base its decision on the fact
that the cells were not the plaintiffs property, but rather on policy
ILCS 510/1." He then cites to Section two which provides some definitions:
"(5) 'Fertilization' and 'conception' each mean the fertilization of a human

ovum by a human sperm, which shall be deemed to have occurred at the time
when it is known a spermatozoon has penetrated the cell membrane of the ovum.
(6) 'Fetus' and 'unborn child' each mean an individual organism of the species
homo sapiens from fertilization until live birth."
141Supra note 98.
Id.
141Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body. 80 B.U.L.Rev. 359,
371 (2000). See Community Blood Bank of the Kansas City Area, Inc., 405 F.2d
1011 (8th Cir.) which found blood to be a commodity or article of commerce that
cannot be restrained by antitrust laws.
144
Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 51 Cal.3d 120 (1990).
145 Id. at 144.
142
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reasons on the effect of allowing a conversion claim on medical
research.146 The legal status of organs and body parts is somewhat
unclear. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, adopted in many
states, addresses organs and tissues in contexts of gifts or
donations-a branch of property law,147 while buying and selling
organs is illegal. In most writings, the discussion of the removal of
organs without consent has centered on property rights. 148 While
preembryos have the potential for life, which makes them "special"
in the eyes of the courts, it does not mean they should leave the
realm of property law. Preembryos lack the ability to think or feel
or breathe and are not yet individuals so they should not be
considered persons but should be afforded "special" respect by the
court. 14 9
The implications of giving unimplanted preembryos a
legal status of a person will have a negative impact on society in
several aspects.
First, because the legal status of unimplanted preembryos is
questionable, there remains a level of uncertainty in the medical
community handling such specimens. While criminal and tort laws
have changed in their treatment of fetuses/embryos/preembryos,
property laws have remained relatively consistent. 15 Property law
Opurposes of property law, such as in the Uniform Probate Code,
which states that an individual in "gestation at a particular time is
treated as living at that time if the individual lives one hundred and
twenty hours or more after birth."'1 5 1 The pro to this is simply that
there is a clear definition of when property rights are granted to an
unborn child whereas criminal and tort laws have left it up to the
interpretation of a judge. If an in vitro fertilization clinic
unimplanted
embryologist
destroys
unused, unclaimed,
146

id.

147
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 755 11. Comp. Stat. 50/1-1 (2005).
148 Rao, supra note 145 at 401.

Karissa Hostrup Windsor, Disposition of Cryopreserved Preembryos After
Divorce, 88 Iowa L. Rev. 1001 (2003).
150 William E. Buelow, To Be or Not to Be: Inconsistencies in the Law
Regarding the Legal Status of the Unborn Fetus, 71 Temp. L.Rev. 963, 984
(1998).
151Id. (Note that the Uniform Probate Code has a born alive requirement before
its property rights are recognized, which once met, the rights are effective
retroactively to conception.)
149
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preembryos, the embryologist will not know if they will be held
liable for wrongful death or reckless homicide under Illinois law.
Laws should provide citizens, medical practitioners, and the legal
profession with a clear guideline and consistency in outcomes.
The current status of Illinois law, as in many jurisdictions, is
currently unclear as to the legislature's intent and possible
outcomes.
One opposition to treating embryos and other gametic
material as property is the possibility that the material will become
more like a market commodity rather than life, leading to buying
and selling them. 152 However, just because the law may classify
unimplanted preembryos as property versus persons does not mean
the law may not also regulate how they must be handled-i.e.,
forbidding the sale of embryos, forbidding the implantation of
embryos without consent, etc. 153 Further, the fact that the
preembryos are considered property does not prevent criminal laws
from being passed in regards to the handling of such property. For
example, the California legislature acted on a scandal that occurred
at the University of California at Irvine involving Dr. Ricardo
Asch. 154 Dr. Asch was found to have taken eggs and frozen
embryos from his patients without consent and implanted them
into other patients and used them in research. 55 In response to the
scandal, California passed a law making the use of sperm, eggs, or
embryos without written consent of the patient providing the
material and the recipient a criminal violation punishable by three
56
to five years in prison and/or a fine of $50,000 maximum.
Therefore, defining preembryos as property does not prevent
legislatures from providing civil or criminal remedies for the
misappropriation of such material.

152

Kristi

Ayala,

The Application of Traditional Criminal Law

Misappropriationof Gametic Materials,24 Am. J. Crim. L. 503, 527 (1997).
153
Id.

Id. at 506-07.
155
Id.
156 Cal. Penal Code § 367(g) (2004).
114

to
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B. Embryo Disposition and Storage
Another issue that should be considered in giving
unimplanted preembryos the legal status of persons involves the
storage of them.
The growth of the assisted reproductive
technology industry is leading to a rising number of frozen
preembryos in storage. Over 400,000 preembryos are stored in the
United States. The original donors will use some, but only about
18% of the original donors say they would consider donating them
to another couple. 157 Some statistics have compared the number of
frozen embryos U.S. fertility clinics are storing to the population of
the city of Oakland, California. 158 In a 2003 survey in the Journal
of Fertility and Sterility, 44,000 of the approximate 400,000 stored
frozen embryos were surplus; surplus embryos result from a death,
divorce, or a couple reaching its family needs.' 59 What to do with
these surplus embryos becomes an issue since the law has not
properly addressed their legal status. This issue becomes especially
important in Illinois in light of Judge Lawrence's ruling that these
frozen embryos are considered persons under Illinois' current law.
Since the United States does not have a national policy
regarding storage, destruction, or donation of abandoned
preembryos, nor has U.S. law clearly defined the legal status of
any preembryo, fertility clinics storing frozen preembryos do not
know what liability they may be exposed to by destroying them.
The United States does not have a national policy on abandoned
preembryos like England, who requires abandoned preembryos to
be destroyed after 5 years per its national law.160 Because facilities
in England typically require original donor consent to allow
http://www.resolve.org/main/national/media/pressrelease/pr20030519.jsp?

157

name=media&tag=press
158 Jim Ritter, What To Do With a City's Worth of Stored Embryos?, Chicago
Sun-Times, Feb. 13, 2005, at News Section page 4.
159

Id..

160 Joshua S. Vinciguerra. Showing "Special Respect"-Permitting Gestation of

Abandoned Preembryos. 9 Alb. L.J.Sci. & Tech. 399, 401 (1999). See also,
Gibson, Dawn. Storage Rules Now Clearer.The West Australian, July 14, 2004,
page 40. West Australia extended the storage deadline from 3 years to 10 years,
allowing fertility clinics to dispose of frozen embryos after 10 years if the
couple that created it cannot be located.
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another couple to use the preembryo, offers to "adopt" these
preembryos are rejected and they are either destroyed or used for
U.S. fertility clinics are willing to store
experimental research.
the frozen embryos indefinitely for a fee; 76% allow embryo
donation to other couples; 60% allow embryo donation to research;
and, 54% allow for embryo disposal. 162 "Among clinics willing to
discard embryos, 2% insisted that couples be present, 80% gave
couples the option to be present, and 14% did not allow couples to
be present."'' 63 Some clinics have said they give the embryo to the
couple for disposal or have a prayer service at the time of disposal,
recognizing that this human tissue must be treated with more
respect than other forms of human tissue.' 6 4 Other options are
available to couples that feel these options are not the best way or
most natural way to handle the disposal. For example, the Fertility
Centers of Illinois offer an alternative option of implanting the
embryos during a point in the mother's menstrual cycle that will
not sustain
the pregnancy, allowing the embryos to die in the
165
womb.
The American Society of Reproductive Technology issued
its opinion on the ethical matter of embryo disposition by stating
that the law is unclear on this matter so some facilities may wish to
continue storing indefinitely.' 66 Its statement goes on to say that
ethically, facilities should be free to dispose of embryos after a
reasonable amount of time has passed suggesting the couple that
created the embryos have abandoned the embryos. 167 Ideally,

161

Id.

162 Ritter, supra note 160.
163

d.

164idt
16 5

Id.

American Society of Reproductive Technology, Disposition of Abandoned
Embryos, at http://www.asrm.org/Media/Ethics/abandon.html (1996). (Ethics
Statement issued by the Society's Ethics Committee and accepted by the Board
of Directors on July 20, 1996).
167 Id. The opinion states "A program's willingness to store embryos
does not
imply an ethical obligation to store them indefinitely. A couple that has not
given written instruction for disposition, has not been in contact with the
program for a substantial period of time, and has not provided a current address
166
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facilities will obtain written instructions signed by couples
addressing disposition instructions in case of death or divorce or
other situations leading to couples' decisions not to implant the
preembryos. 16 8
If no written instructions exist, the Ethics
Committee state that if after reasonable efforts to contact the
original creators have failed and five years have past, facilities may
69
destroy the embryos by thawing them and not implanting them.'
While these are simply guidelines for clinics to follow, the law is
still unclear. Only a few states have addressed the issue of embryo
storage or donation, mainly requiring a couple to provide written
instructions on what to do should there be any unused frozen
170
embryos with Louisiana prohibiting the disposal altogether.
and telephone number cannot reasonably claim injury if the program treats the
embryos as abandoned and disposes of them."
168 Id.

Id. The statement reads as follows: "The Ethics Committee finds that it is
ethically acceptable for a program to consider embryos to have been abandoned
if more than five years have passed since contact with a couple, diligent efforts
have been made by telephone and registered mail to contact the couple at their
last known address, and no written instruction from the couple exists concerning
disposition. In implementing this standard, a program should make diligent
efforts to contact the couple at the last known address both by telephone and
registered mail, return receipt requested. If a program reasonably determines
under this standard that embryos have been abandoned, the Ethics Committee
concludes that the program may dispose of the embryos by removal from
storage and thawing without transfer. In no case without prior consent, should
embryos deemed abandoned be donated to other couples or be used in research."
170 National Conference of State Legislatures, State Laws and Legislation: Use
Storage and Disposal of Frozen Embryos (2005), at
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/embryodisposition.htm. See, California
Penal Code § 367g (2003) which prohibits the use sperm, ova, or embryos in
assisted reproduction technology in a manner other than stated on the written
consent form of the provider of the sperm, ova or embryos. The statute also
requires signed written consent to implant embryos or gametes. The use of
sperm donated to a licensed tissue bank is excluded. California Health & Safety
Codes § 125315 (2003) requires health care providers to give infertility patients
the necessary information to make an informed and voluntary choice regarding
the disposition of any human embryos remaining following the fertility
treatment. Patients must be offered several options, including storing any unused
embryos, donating them to another individual, discarding the embryos, or
donating the remaining embryos for research. See, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-4-106
(2003) relates to parentage issues. The law clarifies the status of eggs, sperm, or
169
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However, should the law start defining unimplanted preembryos as
persons, only Louisiana's code would still stand since it prohibits
the destruction of these juridicial persons. Other state legislatures
would have to address these issues in a different manner. For
example, fertility clinics may be elevated to orphanages, or embryo
donation would have to become embryo
adoption, which is a much
17 1
more expensive and involved process.
C. Negative Impact on Reproductive Medicine
Classifying unimplanted preembryos as persons exposes
fertility clinics and doctors to the potential floodgates of criminal

embryos in case of marriage dissolution. The law also clarifies legal parentage
of a child conceived after the death of a spouse. See, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 742.17
(2004) requires written agreement that provides for the disposition of a couple's
eggs, sperm, and preembryos in the event of a divorce, the death of a spouse, or
any other unforeseen circumstance; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 63.212 (2002) relates to
preplanned adoption agreements, which includes the use of "fertility
techniques," which are defined as artificial embryonation, artificial
insemination, whether in vivo or in vitro, egg donation, or embryo adoption.
See, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:391.1 declares that any child conceived after the
death of a decedent, who specifically authorized in writing his surviving spouse
to use his gametes, shall be deemed the legitimate child of such decedent,
provided the child was born to the surviving spouse, using the gametes of the
decedent, within two years of the death of the decedent. Any heir of the
decedent whose interest in the succession of the decedent will be reduced by the
birth of a child conceived shall have one year from the birth of such child within
which to bring an action to disavow paternity. See, Okla. Stat. tit. 10, § 556
(2000) authorizes human embryo donations and transfers. The law requires
certain techniques to be used by physicians. It requires written consents and
confidentiality. See, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-401, et seq. (2003) creates the
Wyoming Uniform Parentage Act. The law defines "assisted reproduction" and
includes intrauterine insemination; donation of eggs; donation of embryos; invitro fertilization and transfer of embryos; and intracytoplasmic sperm injection
in the definition.
171
See,
http://www.resolve.org/main/national/embdon/guide2.jsp,
and
http://www.resolve.org/main/national/adoption/expect/process.j sp?name=adopti
on&tag=expect. Traditional adoption agencies charge from $5,000 to over
$30,000 and take on average anywhere from two to five years. Embryo
donation processes cost approximately $2500 to $4000 and require much less
time.
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reckless homicide charges and/or wrongful death claims. 172
Allowing such claims could have a crippling effect on the practice
of infertility treatment. 173 Some practitioners believe that if
unimplanted preembryos were to be considered persons under the
law, infertility clinics may cease to exist--declining to practice
medicine under the threat of wrongful death lawsuits for every
perished embryo tissue.17 4 What embryologist or doctor would
want to work on preembryos anymore if they were risking the
same liability as someone who accidentally shoots a living,
breathing person? 175 The potential for discouraging the medical
field from researching and treating infertile couples violates public
policy. It was for this reason that the California Supreme Court
refused to allow a conversion claim in Moore v. Regents. 176

It if

for this reason, too, that Illinois should update its statutory scheme
to avoid establishing personhood rights to unimplanted
preembryos.
D. Proposed Legislative Changes
In light of the many issues and factors discussed in this
paper, the Illinois legislature can deal with the legal status of
unimplanted preembryos in at least two different ways. First and
optimally, Illinois may choose to amend its murder and wrongful
death statutes. The murder statute could be updated to clarify
implanted versus unimplanted preembryos, such as South Dakota
did in its requirement that the perpetrator to know or reasonably
should know that a "woman was bearing a child," which obviously
would require implantation.'77 Ideally, Illinois would adopt clearer
language specifically to its definition of "unborn child" in the

Sherry Colb, Judge Rules Frozen Embryos Are People (Feb. 23, 2005),
availableat http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/02/23/colb.embryos/index.html.
172

173 Id.

David Usborne, Couple to Sue Fertility Clinic Over Wrongful Death of
Embryo, The Independent (London), Feb. 10, 2005, at page 34.
175 Staff Editorial. Daily Illinois, University Wire, Feb. 9, 2005.
176 See supra note 144.
177 See supra note 35-37.
174
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murder statute as Mississippi did.178 By adding a few simple
words to the statutory definition, the medical profession can
practice without the threat of reckless homicide charges. The
current definition reads an "'unborn child' shall mean any
individual of the human species from fertilization until birth.' ' 179 A
proposed revised definition should define an unborn child as "any
individual of the human species from fertilization until birth that is
carriedin the womb." The last clause eliminates the application of
the criminal code to the destruction of unimplanted preembryos,
whether it is destruction due to storage issues or mistaken
destruction due to a laboratory's malpractice.
Illinois' Wrongful Death Statute' 80 would also need to be
updated to clarify when this statute should apply. Unfortunately,
this statute needs more than just a few words added, as it presently
quite unclear. Currently, the fetal death section of Illinois'
Wrongful Death Statute reads "(t)he state of gestation or
development of a human being when an injury is caused."' 8' This
language is unclear as to when the legislature intends to cover a
preembryo. The language should be consistent with the criminal
code's language by stating that "a developing human being from
the time of conception until birth while carried in the womb when
an injury is caused." Again, by making this change, the legislature
will remove the possibility of applying this statute to unimplanted

178

720 ILCS 5/9-1.2, 2.1, 3.2 (2005).

The Illinois murder statute contains

provisions for 1) the Intentional Homicide of an Unborn Child, 2) the Voluntary
Manslaughter of an Unborn Child, and 3) the Involuntary Manslaughter and
Reckless Homicide of an Unborn Child. The destruction of an unimplanted
preembryo is most at risk under §3.2 of the Illinois Murder Code because of the
loose definition of "unborn child". Each section defines "unborn child" as
follows: "an 'unborn child' shall mean any individual of the human species from
fertilization until birth."
179Id.
180
181

740 ILCS 180/2.2 (2005).

Id.

The entire text of this section reads: "The state of gestation or

development of a human being when an injury is caused, when an injury takes
effect, or at death, shall not foreclose maintenance of any cause of action under
the law of this State arising from the death of a human being caused by wrongful
act, neglect or default."
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preembryo destruction, whether for storage issues or due to
medical malpractice.
Option two for the Illinois legislature is to adopt a
definition of "human being" or "person" in the criminal and civil
codes, similar to what Louisiana did but only in its civil code. This
would provide consistency throughout the codes, if done properly.
However, as discussed in Part II of this paper, even Louisiana's
codes lead to dissimilar outcomes under its murder and wrongful
death statutes.
VII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the legal status of unimplanted preembryos
remains to be consistent between many states' criminal and civil
codes. Statutory definitions range from preembryos, fetuses,
unborn children, and an occasional zygote. How the legislature
defines each varies as much as it varies in terminology. The end
problem is inconsistency in what rights are afforded to
unimplanted preembryos through statutes. The trend among the
courts has been to give unimplanted preembryos "special property"
status, but as seen in Illinois' recent case, there is no guarantee
what a court may do. Awarding personhood rights to unimplanted
preembryos may lead to the demise of embryonic research and the
practice of infertility medicine by forcing medical professionals to
practice under the threat of wrongful death lawsuits or even
criminal homicide charges.
In addition, calling unimplanted
preembryos persons forces fertility clinics and laboratories to
permanently store unwanted specimens forever and potentially
complicate embryo donation processes.
The recent case in Illinois ruling that unimplanted
preembryos are human beings under Illinois law should be a cry to
the Illinois legislature to amend its murder and wrongful death
statutes to clarify embryos carried in the womb to avoid
inconsistent outcomes. Alternatively, the Illinois legislature may
statutorily define "human being" or "person" as an individual from
conception until birth while carried in the womb. Making these
changes will provide medical practitioners and the legal
community with certainty and consistency in the law while still
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promoting medical research and the practice of infertility
medicine.

